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Introduction 
 
 
A Common Energy Market in the 
Eurasian Economic Union 
Implications for the European Union and Energy Relations with Russia 
Maria Pastukhova and Kirsten Westphal 
To the east of the European Union a regional energy market is taking shape under the 
auspices of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU). Even if the interests of the participat-
ing states diverge and the ultimate shape of the market remains unclear, the develop-
ment is likely to be substantial. On the one hand, it threatens to deepen the fragmen-
tation of energy markets in Europe and Asia, on the other the process could generate 
new opportunities for cooperation and larger spheres of integration. It is thus worth 
exploring at this early stage the extent to which the emerging energy market is com-
patible with the European Union and the European Energy Community. It is especially 
important to track the effects in the common neighbourhood, above all Ukraine, in 
order to avoid renewed geopolitical disruption. 
 
The Eurasian Economic Union was estab-
lished on 1 January 2015, after Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Russia signed the founding 
treaty in 2014. Kyrgyzstan and Armenia 
have since also joined. The concrete pro-
posals for a common energy market devel-
oped in 2015 are more detailed and con-
crete than any other post-Soviet initiative; 
stability in the energy sector is essential 
for the economic prosperity of the EEU 
member-states. In terms of geographical 
area, this would represent one of the 
world’s largest energy markets, strategi-
cally located between Europe and Asia 
and comprising a population of about 182 
million. The affected countries together 
account for 14.6 percent of the world’s oil 
production and 17.3 percent of natural gas 
production – although this is almost ex-
clusively Russia’s (Kazakhstan contributes 
1.9 percent and 0.6 percent respectively). 
The EEU’s decision-making process is 
complex. Its institutions include the Eura-
sian Economic Commission (EEC) and the 
Supreme Eurasian Economic Council, com-
posed of the heads of state of the member 
countries. While the Commission is respon-
sible for routine questions, fundamental 
decisions about sensitive and strategic 
resources such as energy are taken by the 
Economic Council. There is no clear legis-
lative mechanism. Although the EEC is the 
Union’s legislative organ, the Council also 
possesses the power to issue regulations 
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and decrees, and to point the work of the 
Commission in the “right” direction. The 
EEU also has a Eurasian Intergovernmental 
Council (composed of the prime ministers 
of the member-states) and the Court of the 
Eurasian Economic Union. 
Partly owing to the asymmetrical power 
relations between the EEU members, the 
process is dominated by intergovernmental 
and bilateral negotiations. Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan together con-
tribute less than 15 percent of the Union’s 
joint GDP, and represent almost 20 percent 
of its population. Russia is geographically, 
demographically, economically and mili-
tarily far larger and more powerful than all 
the other members, and correspondingly 
funds almost 80 percent of the EEU inte-
gration process. Under the EEU’s founding 
treaty all decisions at the highest level must 
be reached by consensus under “one coun-
try, one vote”. Belarus and Kazakhstan, 
however, have repeatedly complained of 
Russia exploiting its dominant position. 
A common energy market in the EEU 
would have a significant influence not only 
on its own member-states, but also on the 
European Union, on the Energy Communi-
ty (which exports the energy-related Acquis 
Communautaire to the EU neighbourhood 
and to which the Balkan states, Moldova 
and Ukraine also belong), and on the com-
mon neighbourhood in the Black Sea and 
Caspian regions. The market would also 
reverberate on China’s Silk Road initiative. 
Any revival of the old vision of a shared 
economic space from Lisbon to Vladivostok 
is now – if at all – only conceivable under 
these new premises. Decisively, Russia is 
pursuing the Eurasian integration project – 
against the backdrop of the Ukraine conflict 
– primarily for political motives, in order to 
consolidate its status as the leading power 
in Eurasia and to preserve its own influence 
in the region. 
Concepts for the Energy Market 
The EEC’s energy market concepts were pre-
pared by its legislative body, the Collegium, 
and the concept for the electricity market 
was approved on 8 May 2015 by the Su-
preme Eurasian Economic Council. The 
Collegium approved the gas and oil market 
concepts in December 2015 and they are 
due to be confirmed by the Economic Coun-
cil by the first quarter of 2016. 
The common electricity market is due to 
be realised by 2019, while the concepts for 
oil and gas are to be implemented in stages 
by 2024 and 2025 respectively. Progress on 
integrating energy markets will require the 
successive dismantling of infrastructure, 
commercial and regulatory barriers. 
The concepts are based on existing (part-
ly Soviet-era) infrastructure and on agree-
ments dating from 2010, signed in the con-
text of the customs union. The only new 
elements in the concept for the electricity 
sector are the introduction of a trading 
platform at the international level and the 
commitment to grant all EEU states non-
discriminatory access to national trans-
mission grids. Tariffs for EEU-wide long-
distance transmission are not to exceed 
those at national level. These objectives are 
also relevant for third countries, because 
a quasi EEU-wide grid could contribute not 
only to the development of an electricity 
market within the region, but also to its 
transit potential. 
An agreement on the methodology for 
preparing indicative balances for oil and 
gas products in the EEU was drafted in May 
2015 and approved by the EEC at the end of 
September, also on the basis of agreements 
from 2010. The harmonisation and exchange 
of indicative balances is regarded as a pre-
condition for barrier-free access to trans-
port infrastructure and cross-border trade. 
But creating a common market will ulti-
mately require much more incisive reforms 
with respect to privatisation, competition, 
unbundling and price liberalisation, as well 
as effective, independent regulation. It must 
be remembered that the member states of 
the EEU differ greatly in their progress on 
implementing reforms. 
According to the concepts for the com-
mon EEU energy market published in 2015, 
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the member-states’ obligations under inter-
national treaties, the particularities of 
national markets and the laws of the indi-
vidual states will be taken into account. 
Priority will be granted to provision for 
national markets. 
In terms of the oil market the central 
question – alongside the creation of joint 
infrastructure – is the pricing method for 
crude oil and oil products. Market prices 
are to apply to crude oil and oil products, 
while tariffs for pipeline transport will 
be subject to national regulation. But the 
pricing question is still a matter of contro-
versy. In Russia the tax reform will grad-
ually bring domestic oil prices into line 
with export prices; in the internal markets 
of other EEU member-states, on the other 
hand, no such trend is discernible. These 
sensitive points are therefore only vaguely 
mentioned in the concept. Price formation 
is to be based on market mechanisms and 
fair competition, but will take national 
conditions into consideration. There are 
also differences over gas pricing, which 
under the gas agreement of 2010 was actu-
ally supposed to have been brought into line 
with the market price by 1 January 2015. 
Another point of dispute is the harmoni-
sation of quality standards and norms for 
crude oil and oil products. Belarus and 
Kazakhstan regard this as necessary, while 
Russia believes it to be unrealistic. 
Furthermore all technical and adminis-
trative trade barriers are to be dismantled, 
while commercial exchange and physical 
infrastructure are to be expanded. Market 
mechanisms are given preference, and the 
principle of non-discrimination of econom-
ic entities of the member states applies in 
the common market. Favourable conditions 
for investment are also to be created. In-
dicative balances of consumption, produc-
tion and transmission are to be harmonised 
and shared. 
Many of the same elements recur in the 
concept for the natural gas market, for 
example with respect to uniform standards 
of quality and norms (for calorific value, 
sulphur content etc.). But unlike for the oil 
market, no concrete implementation time-
table is specified. Instead the schedule until 
2020 lists common standards as a priority, 
together with harmonisation of the rele-
vant legislation. Under the objectives for 
a common gas market the concept also 
names non-discrimination, fair competition 
and a transition to market mechanisms, 
as well as a commitment to improve the 
conditions for investment in the gas trans-
port system and to provide access to trans-
port capacities in the EEU in a non-discrimi-
natory and transparent manner. Not least, 
the concept also proposes establishing an 
exchange of information about consump-
tion, pricing and transport capacities. For 
free capacity this is to be in place by 2020. 
The pricing mechanism is described in 
quite some detail in the concept for the 
gas market, which proposes a voluntary 
commitment to achieve market-based gas 
prices. By 1 January 2025 a decision is to 
be reached on setting prices in the EEU on 
a netback basis, meaning net of the costs 
associated with bringing it to market. 
From the international perspective it is 
significant that the extant market concepts 
principally concern oil and gas trading 
within the EEU and not with third states. 
Bilaterally agreed conditions are to con-
tinue to govern trade with other countries. 
It is also noteworthy that the EEU members 
intend to investigate whether their gas ex-
ports compete with one another. 
In summary, it can be said that the deci-
sive details have yet to be negotiated and 
implemented. The example of the European 
Union demonstrates how convoluted and 
difficult such processes can be. Despite 
great ambitions on paper, conflicts are 
predestined in the EEU because far-reaching 
differences are becoming apparent in the 
inter-governmental negotiations. The 
strongest driver to date has been Moscow’s 
geopolitical interest; in other words the 
Kremlin dictated the pace and direction. 
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Asymmetry of Interests 
The existence of (in some cases diametrical-
ly) opposing interests between EEU member-
states hampers the creation of a common 
energy market. These result from an asym-
metrical energy trade and the different 
starting situations of the involved states. 
In the oil sector, resource-rich Russia 
and Kazakhstan are interested above all in 
modernising their refineries and petro-
chemical industries in order to boost value 
added. The oil sector tax reform initiated 
by Moscow in spring 2015 shifts the finan-
cial burden from the export tax to the ex-
traction tax and was conceived as such a 
stimulus. But these incentives are currently 
subverted by the falling oil price, the de-
valuation of the rouble and the Western 
sanctions over Ukraine. In order to generate 
hard currency, Russia is exporting crude 
oil at post-Soviet record levels. These devel-
opments cross-cut the interests of Belarus, 
whose economy is heavily dependent on 
refining and exporting Russian crude. 
Belarus needs access to cheap oil if it is to 
preserve its strong refinery sector and pro-
cessing industry. While Moscow wants a 
pricing mechanism that takes into account 
the specifics of the national markets, Minsk 
argues for a uniform oil price no higher 
than that determined by the international 
agencies, minus the transport and transit 
costs and customs duties incurred in export 
to third countries. Kazakhstan for its part 
insists that pricing be left to the market 
and occur under conditions of fair compe-
tition. 
Minsk also hopes that the common mar-
ket will provide access to cheap and reliable 
supplies of natural gas from Russia. Given 
that more than 90 percent of Belarusian 
electricity is generated using Russian gas, 
the gas price is a top priority for Minsk in 
the talks on a common energy policy. In 
this connection Belarus explicitly demands 
that a common oil and gas market be devel-
oped before the common electricity market 
is tackled – throwing a spanner into the 
ongoing negotiations over the latter. 
Electricity trading between Russia and 
the other EEU members is restricted to 
exports to Belarus and Kazakhstan (with 
respectively 9.7 and 11.7 percent of total 
Russian electricity exports). However, 
because Belarus, Russia, the Kaliningrad 
enclave and the three Baltic states share 
a power ring (BRELL), the Baltic states are 
synchronously connected with the Russian 
and integrated post-Soviet UPS/IPS grid. 
The UPS/IPS grid is also connected to Finland 
via a high-voltage D.C. line. Only small 
amounts of electricity are exchanged be-
tween Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, while 
Armenia is not connected to the other 
EEU member-states at all. 
The trade in oil and gas between re-
source-rich Kazakhstan and Russia and the 
other EEU members is very unbalanced 
and represents only a tiny fraction of total 
exports. Kyrgyzstan for example receives 
no more than 0.001 percent of Russian oil 
exports. 
Trade between Russia and Belarus repre-
sents an exception, with a much higher 
export volume than to the other EEU states. 
In 2014 it amounted to 23.3 million tonnes 
of crude and 20.3 billion cubic metres of 
natural gas (representing 10.4 percent and 
9.5 percent of Russian entire oil and gas 
exports). The two neighbours are linked by 
cross-border value chains. On the one hand 
90 percent of the electricity supply for Bela-
rusian industry is generated from Russian 
gas. On the other, Belarusian refineries 
process almost exclusively Russian crude 
with the products largely also re-exported 
to Russia. 
At the same time businesses are very 
closely linked, giving grounds to expect an 
intensification of trade relations between 
the EEU member-states. Russian businesses 
dominate, even if the current slump in the 
oil price has shrunk their financial leeway. 
The Russian state-owned Gazprom has sub-
sidiaries in all the member-states of the 
Union. In Belarus it is involved in the on-
ward transport of Russian natural gas via 
the Yamal-Europe Pipeline, through its sub-
sidiary Transgas. In Kyrgyzstan it possesses 
SWP Comments 9 
February 2016 
5 
exclusive rights to explore and exploit do-
mestic gas fields until 2028 and has taken 
over the state-owned Kyrgysgas. In the Arme-
nian gas sector Gazprom possesses a mono-
poly via a subsidiary. In Kazakhstan Gaz-
prom operates a joint venture (KazRosGas) 
and runs joint gas and oil exploration 
projects with the Kazakh energy company 
KazMunaiGaz and with Rosneft and Lukoil. 
The Russian electricity utility Inter RAO 
UES also controls Ekibastus power station 
in northern Kazakhstan (output 1 GW) and 
the Armenian Razdanskaya thermal power 
station (1.1 GW). 
There are joint projects in the nuclear 
sector too. Rosatom (Russia) and Belarus 
have agreed to build a nuclear power station 
(2.4 GW) and negotiations on another are 
under way with Kazakhstan. 
Electricity Market as the Driver? 
Electricity market integration is the project 
with the most ambitious timeframe. And 
the electricity market could function as the 
starting shot for the EEU’s common energy 
market, because despite the critical posi-
tion held by Belarus the negotiations are 
already well advanced. 
However, an integrated market can hard-
ly be created without privatisation, compe-
tition, unbundling of vertically integrated 
companies, and an independent regulator. 
And here the starting points diverge enor-
mously. With 223 GW of installed capacity 
Russia possesses considerable surplus, with 
significantly ageing plant. Kazakhstan has 
16.9 GW installed, Belarus 8.3 GW, Kyrgyz-
stan 2.6 GW and Armenia 2.1 GW. In Bela-
rus the electricity market is under complete 
state control through a single vertically 
integrated company, while Russia’s is largely 
run by (part-)privatised companies. The 
Russian wholesale market is liberalised and 
there is a capacity market. Today consumer 
prices remain regulated only in a few re-
gions. The Kazakh market is similar to the 
Russian, but with a different mechanism 
for consumer pricing. There are also con-
siderable regional differences within the 
country, whose three electricity regions 
are only weakly connected to one another. 
A capacity market is to be established in 
2016. Although the Kyrgyz electricity mar-
ket is partially liberalised, it remains domi-
nated by an open joint-stock company, in 
which the state holds a majority stake. 
In principle electricity market integration 
can follow one of three models: a common 
market (the most far-reaching option), a 
common trading platform, or the linkage of 
national markets. In view of the differences 
between the EEU member-states and their 
unwillingness to restructure their national 
electricity markets, the common electricity 
market has been modelled on the European 
Union’s electricity market for continental 
Europe. This model retains the national mar-
kets, which operate in parallel to a com-
mon market on which companies can trade 
both bilaterally and through a centralised 
auction platform. An electricity exchange 
would be a new element for cross-border 
electricity trading in the EEU, whereas bi-
lateral trading is already well-established. 
While the capacity of the cross-border trans-
mission lines would permit trading of 
about 30 GWh annually, just 6.5 GWh were 
actually traded in 2014. Russia’s exports are 
in fact declining, and now represent less 
than 4 percent of total generation. Imports 
are less than 1 percent of total consumption. 
Since Soviet times today’s EEU members 
have been connected by a shared trans-
mission grid. But this network needs to be 
further expanded and above all compre-
hensively modernised. 
Implications for the European 
Union and the Energy Community 
Alongside the open question of how quickly 
and incisively a common market will in 
fact emerge in the EEU, the question of 
what internal reforms will be initiated in 
the process is also important. This affects 
above all the monopoly on pipeline trans-
port, but also that on exports and imports. 
This is of interest to Europe in relation to 
diversified gas imports from Russian non-
SWP Comments 9 
February 2016 
6 
Gazprom and Central Asian producers, and 
also in relation to electricity trading. 
In the 1990s the transit of Central Asian 
gas through Russian pipelines was a stick-
ing point in the Energy Charter process, be-
cause Gazprom wished to protect its mono-
poly on transport and exports. Attempts by 
the Russian firms Rosneft and Novatek to 
gradually break open that monopoly failed 
again at the end of 2015. It is therefore 
hard to imagine the EEU integration pro-
cess producing any change there. Circum-
stances within Russia could, however, lead 
to reforms. On the one hand Moscow shows 
great interest in expanding the area of inte-
gration; on the other, economic pressure is 
increasing as a result of sanctions, falling 
commodity prices and the slide of the 
rouble. Any reform moves in Russia could 
also present the European Union with a 
new situation, for example if other Russian 
gas companies would supply e.g. via the 
Nord Stream pipeline. 
Despite the crisis over Ukraine, there 
are thus good reasons to approach the EEU 
process constructively. From the European 
perspective the question is to what extent 
one can encourage a positive market-led 
development from the outside. In the cur-
rent complex political situation any active 
attempt by the European Union to exert 
influence is likely to be counterproductive. 
A more promising option is cooperation 
at the technical, operational and regulatory 
(working) levels. Looking ahead, it is impor-
tant to avoid fragmentation in the Euro-
Asian energy market and to ensure com-
patibility. This is especially relevant at the 
boundaries of the different energy spaces 
and for countries located in-between that 
belong neither to the EEU nor to the Euro-
pean Energy Community. Creating a com-
mon energy market for the EEU could build 
new bridges – or create deeper rifts in 
Europe. 
In Europe it is widely assumed that the 
EEU is a project aiming to isolate its mem-
bers from the European Union and estab-
lish a political coalition under Russian 
leadership. But within the EEU both inte-
gration processes are in fact regarded as 
complementary at expert and working 
level. It is emphasised that closer coopera-
tion with institutions of and in the Euro-
pean Union is essential and would offer 
advantages to both sides. Both in expanding 
an EEU-wide energy grid and in modernis-
ing the energy market, it is noted that the 
Eurasian Economic Union will be heavily 
reliant on foreign investment, know-how 
and technology transfer. Thereby it is em-
phasised that the cooperation must be 
based on shared economic interests; differ-
ent political values of the European Union 
and EEU member-states should not be made 
into a problem. 
The fact that the European continental 
electricity market was taken as the model 
for the EEU’s common electricity market 
leads to discussion of the potential of a 
common economic area with the European 
Union entering the domestic Russian dis-
course. Here there are obvious similarities 
with the vision “From Lisbon to Vladivos-
tok” propagated by Vladimir Putin in 2010. 
The representatives of the EEC Collegium 
responsible for energy and infrastructure 
are seeking dialogue with European actors 
in the energy field. The chair of the EEC is 
Viktor Khristenko, who long led the Rus-
sian end of the EU-Russia Dialogue. Euro-
pean institutions visited by members of 
the Collegium include the independent 
Council of European Energy Regulators 
(CEER), marketplaces for energy and related 
products such as EEX, ICE and ICE ENDEX, 
the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators (ENTSO-E) and the Euro-
pean technical coordination centre for 
system security CORESO. 
Apparently purely technical and com-
mercial processes have potentially major 
impacts on the interfaces between different 
markets. They can deepen demarcation 
lines and exacerbate geopolitical conflicts. 
Although little strategic attention is gener-
ally devoted to the electricity sector, it is 
precisely here that important long-term 
changes are emerging in the Black Sea, Cas-
pian and Baltic regions. The Baltic Energy 
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Market Interconnection Plan (BEMIP) 
proposed synchronising the Baltic States 
with the European continental network. 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are still part 
of the Soviet-era power ring (BRELL), and 
otherwise only connected to the Scandina-
vian Nord Pool electricity market via high-
voltage D.C. lines. But talks about de-syn-
chronisation with Belarus and Russia were 
suspended in 2014 after a study showed 
that keeping the existing system made 
better economic sense. Electricity market 
integration in the EEU context could create 
a whole new dynamic here, for example 
in connection with the planned nuclear 
power station in Kaliningrad, which will 
be looking to sell electricity to the Euro-
pean Union. On the other hand, a de-syn-
chronisation forced through for geopoliti-
cal reasons would create a great need for 
investment in network connectivity in 
Belarus and Russia and could lead to new 
political turmoil. 
The implications of developments in 
the Black Sea region are even more far-
reaching. Synchronising Turkey with the 
European continental network in 2014/ 
2015 was a crucial step. A feasibility study 
has shown that Romania, Moldova and 
Ukraine could also be connected to the 
European continental network if that was 
politically desirable. It would be technically 
possible, but expensive. If that meant dis-
connecting Crimea and the separatists in 
eastern Ukraine, it could write the military 
front lines into the grid architecture and 
de facto cement existing demarcation lines. 
This presents the European Union with 
a dilemma, as various sides in the conflict 
have without doubt used energy supplies 
as a means of hybrid warfare. Moves that 
might create greater security and flexibility 
for one side would leave others out on a 
limb. A tricky situation could also arise in 
the Caucasus, where Georgia is a candidate 
for the Energy Community, while South 
Ossetia, Abkhasia and Armenia are being 
drawn into the orbit of the EEU. 
Recommendations 
The European Union should follow the 
development of an EEU-wide energy market 
very closely, as the process is strategically 
important for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
a fragmentation of the energy markets in 
Europe should be avoided, as it would 
create new conflict lines and commercial 
disputes. Secondly, the European Union 
possesses a manifest interest in free and 
liberalised trade. The EEU’s increasingly 
close cooperation with China could shift 
the region’s orientation from Europe to 
Asia and establish mercantilist trading 
patterns. China and Russia are discussing 
the possibility of integrating the EEU into 
the Silk Road Economic Belt, and China is 
specifically channelling long-term funding 
into infrastructure projects in the region. 
From this perspective it would seem 
advisable to seek dialogue at an early stage. 
The European Union should respond to 
the EEU and to China’s Silk Road initiative 
with integrative proposals seeking shared 
technical standards and norms, compatible 
trading forums, and a joint codex for ener-
gy trading, investment and transit. 
A realistic perspective is helpful here, 
because both integration processes – the 
EEU’s and the Silk Road initiative alike – 
are driven by tangible economic interests. 
The European Union’s “DNA” is different 
of course; it is rooted in general, commonly 
shared values and norms (such as solidarity). 
Even if the EEU and the European Union 
are not dissimilar on paper, their respective 
dynamics differ significantly. 
At the same time, the European Union 
must possess an interest in compatible 
norms, standards and rules. At the working 
and technical levels, despite geopolitical 
troubles, there are good grounds for offer-
ing the EEU cooperation in developing and 
implementing its common energy market. 
The repercussions at the boundaries of the 
energy spaces and on the common neigh-
bourhood could otherwise be (even more) 
consequential. 
First and foremost, cooperation at work-
ing level – for example concerning high 
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voltage grids, experiences in unequal power 
generation and regional distribution, mecha-
nisms of cross-border trading, network 
planning and IT security – could contribute 
to ensuring compatibility between the 
European Union and the EEU, and at least 
not drifting further apart at the technical, 
commercial and regulatory levels. Should 
direct cooperation between EU institutions 
and EEU continue to be difficult, the Energy 
Community could also become involved. 
But ultimately a plurilateral dialogue be-
tween Europe and Asia needs to be expanded 
and intensified at multiple levels: through 
existing institutions such as the Interna-
tional Energy Charter process, but also via 
new mechanisms in the UN Economic Com-
mission for Europe (UNECE) and the OSCE. 
The lack of mechanisms and forums is a 
problem. 
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